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Abstract: Over the past 25 years, federal courts have sanctioned displays of religious symbols on 
public property – including the crèche, the Ten Commandments, and the Latin cross – by 
privileging their secular value or because nearby secular symbols wash away their religiosity.  
This paper contends that these cases have resulted in government secularization of the religious.  
Though the appearance of religion has increased in the Public Square, this effort has been 
partially self-defeating because the distinctive substance of religion has been eroded by this 
jurisprudence, thereby weakening the sanctity of religion.  Minimizing the religious import of 





The Supreme Court has sanctioned displays of Christian crèches,1 Jewish menorahs,2 and 
the Judeo-Christian Ten Commandments.3  Lower courts have rejected Establishment Clause 
claims against the display of the Latin cross on public property,4 and a lower court has ruled that 
kneeling, bowing one’s head, and clasping one’s hands do not constitute prayer.5  All of these 
decisions justify the inclusion of religious symbols and practices in public venues on the grounds 
that they are not actually religious.  Though this rationale seems to embrace a bizarre 
contradiction, federal courts have ruled that in these particular contexts, the government is not 
recognizing the religious importance of these icons, but rather the secular or historical values the 
symbols also underscore.  Alternatively, courts have declared that the placement of secular 
symbols near the religious ones effectively wash away their theological significance.  Ironically, 
many on the Religious Right celebrate these court decisions as victories for the advancement of 
religion, while the long term consequences of these decisions prove harmful to religion.  Many 
separationist advocates rue these court decisions because they demonstrate the influence 
Christianity maintains in formulating governmental policy.6 
                                               
1 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
2 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
3 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
4 Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (2008); American Atheists v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245 
(2007). 
5 Borden v. School District of East Brunswick,  No. 05-cv-05923 (2006). 
6 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 27, 2005. 
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These decisions undermine the sanctity of religion by desacralizing fundamental religious 
tenets, practices, and symbols.  When government affirms the presence of religion – its 
scriptures, symbols, and rituals – in the Public Square for historical or other secular reasons, two 
mutually exclusive conclusions are possible: (1) emphasis on the secular value of religion is a 
ruse and the government is actually recognizing the religious value of these public displays, or 
(2) government is assigning public value to these various expressions of religion by secularizing 
them.  If the first conclusion is true, it poses a massive threat to the Establishment Clause as the 
government is orchestrating a fraud upon the Constitution.  The implications of the second 
conclusion constitute the substance of this essay.  The government undermines the sanctity of 
religion by stripping these religious symbols and scriptures of their religious import. 
 Government in America, while secular, has, at the same time, been appreciative of the 
sociopolitical contributions made by religion.  This recent development in law undermines that 
appreciation by recognizing religious symbols and texts as something less than holy. 
Section II of this Paper examines three areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
which document the extent to which federal courts have secularized religious displays: crèche 
and menorah display cases, Ten Commandment display cases and the Latin cross display cases.  
I argue that the presence of secular objects, such as Santa Claus or snowmen, does not diminish 
the religious significance of the crèche.  Likewise, judicial attempts to emphasize the secular or 
cultural heritage of the Ten Commandments or the Latin cross do not give adequate respect to 
the religious power these symbols carry.  This section also examines a case in which a lower 
court judge attempted to secularize the act of prayer.7  Section III will assess the harm by a civil 
assault on the sanctity of religion in these cases and place this analysis within current 
Establishment Clause literature.  Critics have argued that complex symbols can have different 
                                               
7 BORDEN, supra note___. 
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meanings to different people, which would make the dilemma of government secularizing 
religion a false choice.  I draw upon the work of Ronald Dworkin and Sanford Levinson to 
respond to this critique.  Section IV concludes the essay by weighing the pragmatic approach 
adopted by conservative Christian litigators against the religious principles undermined in the 
process.    
II. Surveying Modern Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
A. Public Displays of the Crèche and the Menorah 
 
The Supreme Court first laid the groundwork for this jurisprudence in a challenge to a 
public display of a nativity scene came from Pawtucket, Rhode Island.  The display, located in a 
shopping district, included figures of Santa Claus and his reindeer, a Christmas tree, a banner 
reading “Season’s Greetings,” images of carolers, and (somewhat bizarrely) a clown and an 
elephant.8  The display also contained a “life-sized” nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus 
Christ, also known as a Christian crèche.   
It is clear from the oral argument in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) that proponents of a 
government-sanctioned display of religion were willing to secularize religion as a deliberate 
strategy to achieve a legal victory.  Their argument offered the greatest potential for escaping the 
snares of the Lemon test.9  First, the government's action must have a secular legislative purpose.  
Second, the government's action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or 
inhibiting religion.  Third, the government's action must not result in an “excessive government 
entanglement” with religion.  The city’s attorney told the Court that Christmas had become a 
“secular folk holiday,” a description of a religious festival that should have offended any 
                                               
8 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 206 (2 Revised ed. 
1994). 
9 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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adherent to Christianity.  They further argued that the promotion of religion through the crèche 
was “overwhelmed by secular” displays – an acknowledgment that belief related to “the birth of 
the Christ” had been superseded by secular interests.  The city’s attorney also argued that the 
crèche could be justified by history and tradition.  At that time, displays of the crèche on public 
grounds or with government sponsorship were common in many communities across the 
country, and the display in Pawtucket had been ongoing for 40 years.10  
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, sided with the city and allowed the crèche to remain on 
display.  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger largely adopted the rationale 
offered by the city that the purpose of the overall display, both the crèche and the secular 
elements, served a secular purpose – namely recognizing a national holiday. Thus the crèche, 
though recognized as a religious symbol, was deemed to create a benefit to religion that is only 
“indirect, remote, and incidental”11 because of the context in which it is displayed and because it 
is a “passive symbol.”12   Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that a “[f]ocus exclusively on the 
religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the 
Establishment Clause.”13  So, in order to avoid that eventuality, he minimized the religious 
component of the crèche.  In this case, while the Court did not directly secularize a religious 
symbol, it articulated the principle that surrounding a religious symbol with enough secular 
symbols reduces the religious symbol to a de minimus contribution.   
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called the crèche a “traditional 
symbol” of Christmas that has “cultural significance” in addition to its “religious aspects.”14  
                                               
10 Fred Barbash, Justices Consider Santa Clauses, Colored Lights and Creches, WASHINGTON POST, October 5, 
1983, at A3. 
11 LYNCH, supra note___ at 683-84. 
12 Id. at 686. 
13 Id. at 680. 
14 Id. at 681 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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Rather than applying the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor proposed a new Establishment Clause 
theory – the endorsement test.   This test, which became more popular with the Court in 
subsequent cases, inquires “whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice 
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval [of a religion].”15  Justice 
O’Connor and the chief justice analogized the display of the crèche to the display of religious 
artwork in a government-funded museum, a situation that did not create First Amendment 
difficulties. 
Justices William Brennan and Harry Blackmun wrote vigorous dissenting opinions,16 
both of which contended that the majority had undermined the sanctity of religion.  Justice 
Brennan argued that the Court’s classification of the crèche as a traditional symbol on par with 
Santa Claus and his reindeer “is offensive to those for whom the creche has profound 
significance.”17  Justice Brennan elaborated an extensive account of the religious meaning of the 
holiday of Christmas, which reads like a heartfelt expression of his personal Catholic faith.  
According to Brennan, the crèche is “the chief symbol of the belief that a divine Savior was 
brought into the world and that the purpose of this miraculous birth was to illuminate a path 
toward salvation and redemption.”18  Justice Blackmun’s more succinct dissent focused squarely 
on the sanctity of religion.  He wrote: 
The creche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for 
commercial purposes but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the religious 
tenor of a display of which it is an integral part.  The city has its victory – but it is a Pyrrhic one 
indeed…Surely this is a misuse of a sacred symbol.19 
 
                                               
15 Id. at 691. 
16 Both dissents end with the phrase “I dissent,” which some consider a more passionate expression of disagreement 
than the more customary phrase “I respectfully dissent.” See, e.g., Frank J. Murray, Ginsburg's Dissent Shows Lack 
of 'Respect', THE WASHINGTON TIMES, December 14, 2000, at A11.. 
17 LYNCH, supra note___ at 711-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 708. 
19 Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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 Five years later the Court again dealt with holiday displays in County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU.20  This case featured challenges to two separate public displays: one of a crèche in the 
county courthouse and the other a Christmas tree displayed alongside a menorah and a sign 
“saluting liberty” outside a local government building.  The crèche, unlike the one at issue in 
Lynch was not presented with any other secular Christmas displays, and, also unlike Lynch, the 
crèche included a banner declaring: “Gloria in Excelsis Deo.”  The Court split 5-4 to strike down 
the crèche display on Establishment Clause grounds but a different 5-4 majority upheld the 
display of the menorah and the Christmas tree.  The only person to be in the majority for both 
halves of the case was Justice Blackmun who authored a majority opinion that seems to 
undermine the position he took in Lynch.   
 Justice Blackmun observed that both Christmas and Chanukah are “cultural events”21 in 
addition to being religious holidays.  The cultural significance of Chanukah in modern American 
society, according to Blackmun, may have derived from its proximity to Christmas.  Justice 
Blackmun also characterized the crèche and the menorah as religious symbols, while he 
classified the Christmas tree as a secular symbol with religious roots.  In addition to their 
different fact patterns, County of Allegheny also broke with Lynch in that Justice Blackmun 
adopted the endorsement test, first developed by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lynch, 
as the relevant inquiry to satisfy the Establishment Clause.   
As outlined by Justice Blackmun, government may not favor, prefer, or promote one 
religious belief over another.  This decision left courts to answer the question of whether or not a 
“reasonable observer”22 would conclude that a religious display had the effect of endorsing a 
religion.  The reasonable observer was defined as a person who has knowledge of the context 
                                               
20 COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, supra note___. 
21 Id. at 585. 
22 Id. at 620. 
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and history of the display and who has an appreciation for the Constitution’s religion clauses.  
Like the majority in Lynch Justice Blackmun believed the broader context of the entire display is 
crucial in determining a possible constitutional violation. Within that framework, Justice 
Blackmun concluded that the presence of a banner containing a religious message and the 
absence of other secular adornments translated into an Establishment Clause violation for the 
crèche.23   
The other display presented even greater interpretive difficulties.  Justice Blackmun 
reasoned that since the Christmas tree was a secular symbol it could have the effect of 
secularizing the religious significance of the menorah: “In the shadow of the tree, the menorah is 
readily understood as simply a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of 
observing the winter holiday season.”24  Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion echoed most of 
Justice Blackmun’s argument, though she refused to secularize the menorah, an argument she 
described as “strain[ed].”25  Instead, Justice O’Connor upheld the display on the grounds that the 
message of the overall display (including the sign saluting liberty) promoted a message of 
religious pluralism.  Justice Kennedy criticized Blackmun’s approach as “a jurisprudence of 
minutiae” because it forces courts to consider the placement of “Santas, talking wishing wells, 
reindeer, or other secular symbols” that might wash away the religious significance of the 
religious significance of the crèche.26    
 Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment of the crèche and dissenting 
from the judgment related to the menorah and Christmas tree.  Justice Brennan, instead, argued 
                                               
23 It is noteworthy that Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lynch disagreed with the idea that secular objects could detract 
from the religious value of a crèche, yet he adopts that standard in Allegheny County. 
24 COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, supra note___ at 617. 
25 Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J, concurring). 
26 Id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  These symbols were present in Lynch, but not in 
this case. 
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that the presence of the menorah highlighted the religious significance to the Christmas tree, 
especially in light of the sign saluting religious pluralism.  If the sign’s message was true, so the 
argument went, the display must have honored more than one religion, which made it 
problematic to declare the Christmas tree as secular in that context.  Justice Brennan also rejected 
the pluralism argument, based on Justice Blackmun’s observation that its proximity to the 
Christmas made Chanukah more prominent.  The concept of a winter holiday display was 
considered offensive to Jews because it “sends an impermissible signal that only holidays 
stemming from Christianity…favorably dispose the government towards ‘pluralism.’”27 
 
B. Public Displays of the Ten Commandments  
The Supreme Court first dealt with the constitutionality of public displays of the Ten 
Commandments in the 1980 case Stone v. Graham.28  At issue was a Kentucky law requiring a 
poster of the Ten Commandments to be placed in every public classroom in the state at private 
expense.  The Court granted certiorari, and in the same per curiam opinion, summarily struck 
down the statute on Establishment Clause grounds on a 5-2 vote.29  At the bottom of the Ten 
Commandments posters in small print was a disclaimer noting that the Ten Commandments 
provided the basis of the “fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law 
of the United States.”30  The Court’s majority, however, quickly dismissed the legislature’s 
pretext, noting the Ten Commandments “are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian 
                                               
27 Id. at 646 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
28 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
29 Two justices voted to dissent on jurisdictional grounds. 
30 STONE, supra note___ at 39. 
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faiths”31 that cover not just secular legal duties, but sectarian religious duties.  As a result, the 
purpose of the display, the majority reasoned, was “plainly religious in nature.”32 
 The Court’s reasoning in Stone did not settle the controversy, and the same issue 
appeared again 25 years later in a pair of cases, McCreary County v. ACLU33 and Van Orden v. 
Perry.34  McCreary, which like Stone, came from Kentucky, involved a challenge to two Ten 
Commandments displays erected inside two county courthouses in 1999.  After the ACLU 
brought suit challenging the display, the two counties broadened their displays by including 
secular documents that had religious components, such as the Mayflower Compact and the 
Declaration of Independence.  Van Orden, on the other hand, came from a challenge to a Ten 
Commandments monument on the state Capitol grounds in Austin, Texas that had been donated 
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961.   
In the 25 years since Stone, two major relevant changes had taken place.  The Supreme 
Court’s personnel had changed significantly.  Second, conservative Christian groups – 
sometimes referred to as the Religious Right – had become active in politics, both generally and 
especially within the courts.35  Mathew Staver36 of the Liberty Council represented McCreary 
County before the Supreme Court, and over a dozen conservative Christian organizations 
submitted amicus briefs on these two cases.  The American Center for Law and Justice, another 
prominent Religious Right litigation group, submitted an amicus brief in Van Orden, chronicling 
in great detail the cultural and secular influence of the Ten Commandments.  The brief even cited 
a variety of journal articles from secular disciplines which utilize the term “Ten 
                                               
31 Id. at 41. 
32 Id. at 43. 
33 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
34 VAN ORDEN, supra note___. 
35 See HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION (2005). 
36 I contacted Mathew Staver seeking comments on my manuscript.  After receiving an invitation from him to send 
along a copy, I never heard back. 
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Commandments,” such as an Executive Health magazine article entitled the “The Ten 
Commandments of Buying TV Fitness Gadgets.”37  The ACLJ brief did not even try to preserve 
the religious meaning of the First Table of the Ten Commandments either; they argued the entire 
text had secular value.38  This win-at-any-cost strategy is consistent with Professor Hacker’s 
account of the Christian right’s litigation strategy,39 and it received criticism from an unlikely 
member of the Supreme Court. 
Like the ACLJ, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott based his position at oral argument 
on the notion that the Ten Commandments form the historical basis for American law, thus 
creating a legitimate secular purpose for the display, Justice Antonin Scalia retorted: “You’re 
watering it down to say the only message is a secular message.  I can’t agree with you. ‘Our laws 
come from God.’  If you don’t believe it sends that message, you’re kidding yourself……I 
would consider it a Pyrrhic victory for you to win on the grounds you’re arguing.”40  Although 
he used language identical to Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lynch, Justice Scalia nonetheless 
reached the opposite conclusion.  Justice Scalia has argued that the role of Christianity did not 
amount to an establishment of a national religion because it does not coerce individuals into 
worshipping against their will.41 
Despite Justice Scalia’s admonition, the secular value of the Ten Commandments became 
the lynchpin for both cases.  In a five-to-four decision on McCreary, the Court ruled that the 
Kentucky Ten Commandments display violated the Establishment Clause, while on Van Orden, 
                                               
37 Brief for American Center for Law and Justice at 24-26, VAN ORDEN, supra note___. 
38 The Fist Table describes the commandments imposing a purely religious duty, such as not taking the Lord’s name 
in vain, whereas the duties imposed by the Second Table, such as the prohibition on killing, have secular equivalents 
in most legal systems.  See ROGER WILLIAMS & JAMES CALVIN DAVIS, ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 116-21 (2008). 
39 HACKER, supra note___. 
40 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Consider Religious Displays, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 3, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A05E3D7133DF930A35750C0A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&&sc
p=6&sq=van%20orden%20v.%20perry&st=cse (last visited Mar 12, 2009). 
41 Scalia’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is somewhat similar coercion test was first developed by Justice 
Kennedy in his opinion in the Allegheny County case. 
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a five-to-four majority upheld the constitutionality of the Texas display.  The only member of the 
Court to be in the majority in both cases was Justice Stephen Breyer whose opinion asserted the 
context and history of the two cases differed so greatly that the two Ten Commandments 
monuments served different purposes.  From Justice Breyer’s perspective, the Kentucky displays 
of the Ten Commandments, which originally were not displayed with any other items, were 
intended to achieve “substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them.”42  The 
Texas monument, however, fit within a broader display of items marking the secular history of 
Texas, and thus, in Breyer’s opinion, the Ten Commandments served a secular purpose.  
Notably, Breyer presented the case through a false dichotomy.  If the Court struck down the 
display, it would lead “the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our 
Establishment Clause traditions.”43  But, if striking down the monument was hostility to religion, 
then by that logic, would it not follow that allowing the display should represent recognition of 
religion? 
Breyer’s rational secularization of the Ten Commandments led to criticism from both 
ideological wings of the Court.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion in Van 
Orden, upholding the religious value of the Ten Commandments but dismissing the threat posed 
to the Establishment Clause by the public display of such a monument.  Justice John Paul 
Stevens’ dissent in Van Orden gave a backhanded compliment to the plurality opinion in that 
case, even though that opinion led to a contradictory conclusion on the Establishment Clause 
question. “Thankfully, the plurality does not attempt to minimize the religious significance of the 
                                               
42 VAN ORDEN, supra note___ at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
43 Id. at 704. 
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Ten Commandments,” Stevens wrote, implicitly referencing Breyer’s concurrence.  “Attempts to 
secularize what is unquestionably a sacred text defy credibility and disserve people of faith.”44   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas echoed a critique similar to the one 
expressed at oral argument by Justice Scalia.  Like Scalia, however, Thomas still upheld the Ten 
Commandments displays, but on originalist grounds that would not force the government to 
secularize religion. He wrote: “The Court's foray into religious meaning either gives insufficient 
weight to the views of non-adherents and adherents alike, or it provides no principled way to 
choose between those views.”45  In dicta, Justice Thomas also took issue with the Court’s logic 
in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,46 wherein the Court sustained the 
constitutionality of the phrase “one Nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance partially on 
the grounds that such a nonsectarian reference to God serves a secular purpose.   Justice Thomas 
argued: “Telling either nonbelievers or believers that the words ‘under God’ have no meaning 
contradicts what they know to be true.”47   
In that case, Justice O’Connor justified keeping “under God” in the Pledge by laying out 
a test for “ceremonial deism,” which includes a prong for minimal religious content.48  What 
seems like minimal religious content to one person is a deeply held religious value for others.  
For instance, Jews will often write the word God as G-d because of a biblical commandment to 
not let the word God be defaced.  Some Jews also avoid speaking the word “Adonai,” which 
translates to “the Lord,” outside of prayer or study.49  While describing the words “under God” 
as religious in nature, Justice O’Connor argues that this reference can serve a secular purpose by 
                                               
44 Id. at 716-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
46 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
47 VAN ORDEN, supra note___ at 693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
48 NEWDOW, supra note___ at 42-43. 
49 Jeffrey Wolfson Goldwasser, ASK THE RABBI - WHY SOME JEWS SPELL GOD, "G-D"? ABOUT.COM, 
http://judaism.about.com/od/reformjudaismfaq/f/god_spelling.htm (last visited Dec 8, 2010). 
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“solemnizing public occasions.”50  While I would agree that the words “under God” do not refer 
to a specific religion,51 O’Connor argues that a reasonable observer “would not perceive these 
acknowledgments as signifying a government endorsement…of religion over nonreligion.”52  
Using religion to legitimate state functions should raise the specter of theocracy.  By treating 
these religious invocations as serving a secular purpose, Justice O’Connor is stating that the 
concept of God is devoid of theological meaning because it cannot be used to distinguish 
between religion and nonreligion. 
 
C. Prayer Cases 
 Marcus Borden is the football coach at East Brunswick High School in New Jersey.  For 
fifteen years, Borden joined his team in prayer activities led by a local minister at dinner before a 
football game and in the locker room.  In 1997, the school’s athletic director stopped the minister 
from delivering the prayer.  Instead, the minister wrote a prayer, which a player on the team then 
delivered.  From 2003 to 2005, Borden alternated between leading the team in prayer himself 
and having a student volunteer initiate the prayer.  When the school district attempted to limit 
Borden’s involvement in the religious activity, he resigned.  Borden changed his mind and was 
reinstated when he promised to comply with the school district’s policy.   
Borden then initiated a lawsuit to “show  his respect for his players, respect for The Team 
Prayers, and respect for East Brunswick's football tradition by engaging in two silent acts during 
The Team Prayers: (i) bowing his head during grace; and (ii) taking a knee with his team in the 
locker room.”53  A photo in the Boston Globe demonstrates Borden engaging in a third form of 
                                               
50 NEWDOW, supra note___ at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
51 Of course, this reference does imply favoritism for monotheistic religions. 
52 NEWDOW, supra note___ at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
53 Borden v. School District of East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 162-63 (2008). 
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potentially religious activity – clasping his hands together.54  Borden’s lawyer told the New York 
Times “The event of a high school football team saying a prayer is such a part of the culture of 
our country that it is not a religious event.”55  The Alliance Defense Fund, a key Christian 
conservative litigation group, filed an amicus brief in support of Borden’s contention that he was 
not engaging in religious activity by bowing his head and kneeling.56  On the other hand, the 
Interfaith Alliance, joined by Jewish, Muslim and Sikh religious groups submitted an amicus 
brief warning the Third Circuit against secularizing actions that are intimately associated with 
prayer in a variety of religions.57 
 Federal District Court Judge Dennis Cavanaugh granted Borden’s request, noting: “I 
agree that an Establishment Clause violation would occur if the coach initiated and led the 
activity, but I find nothing wrong with remaining silent and bowing one’s head and taking a knee 
as a sign of respect for his players’ actions and traditions, nor do I believe would a reasonable 
observer.”58  The school district appealed to the Third Circuit Court, and a three-judge panel 
reversed Judge Cavanaugh.  Judge Michael Fisher concluded: “Based on the history and context 
of Borden's conduct in coaching the EBHS football team over the past twenty-three years, 
Borden is in violation of the Establishment Clause when he bows his head and takes a knee while 
his team prays.”59   
                                               
54 Stan Grossfeld, An Issue of Fair Pray, THE BOSTON GLOBE, November 7, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/sports/schools/football/articles/2006/11/07/an_issue_of_fair_pray/ (last visited Dec 7, 
2010). 
55 Michael S. Schmidt, Coach Sues for the Right To Pray With His Team, NEW YORK TIMES, November 23, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F07E1DE1631F930A15752C1A9639C8B63. 
56 Alyssa Farah, Praying-coach case heads to Supreme Court, WORLDNET DAILY, November 22, 2008, 
http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=81692. 
57 Interfaith Alliance Weighs in on School Prayer Case, , http://www.interfaithalliance.org/news/87-interfaith-
alliance-weighs-in-on-school-prayer-case (last visited Dec 7, 2010). 
58 BORDEN, supra note___ at 164. 
59 Id. at 174. 
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Judge Fisher said that even if Borden did not intend to violate the Establishment Clause 
by bowing his head and kneeling, a reasonable observer would likely come to that very 
conclusion given his history of religious activities.  If a coach who did not have this history had 
raised this lawsuit, the Court of Appeals might decide the case differently, though in a 
concurring opinion Judge Theodore McKee disagreed with this conclusion.60  To Judge McKee, 
the plaintiffs in this case are trying to create cognitive dissonance where none should occur – that 
somehow the actions of bowing one’s head and kneeling can mean one thing for Coach Borden 
in church and another thing in a locker room. 
 Though the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear this case,61 in other school prayer cases 
the Court has proven more adept at properly classifying religious conduct.  For instance, in Lee 
v. Weisman,62 the Court was asked to review a school district policy that allowed prayers at 
graduation ceremonies so long as they met certain guidelines, one of which is that the prayer 
must be nonsectarian.  Before the case reached the Supreme Court, a three-judge panel on the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that such a prayer would not violate the Establishment 
Clause because a nonsectarian prayer was akin to promoting a civil religion.63  Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion noted that while a nonsectarian prayer would be “more acceptable,”64 he did not 
attempt to secularize this form of prayer.  Instead, he argued against attempts to minimize the 
harm done by such a prayer as “an affront to the rabbi who offered them and to all those for 
whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine authority.”65 
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D. Public Displays of the Latin Cross 
 The effects of the decisions on religious symbols discussed above have trickled down the 
federal court system.  Indeed, their credulity has been stretched further by a new line of cases 
clustered around the question of whether or not a public display of the Latin cross violates the 
Establishment Clause.  Two federal district court judges have written opinions66 denying an 
Establishment Clause violation based on the secular significance of the cross, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently addressed the issue in dicta.67 
 For almost a century, the scenic landscape of Mt. Soledad, a public park located in San 
Diego, California, has featured a Latin cross.  The most recent of the three iterations of the cross 
is a 29 feet tall recessed-concrete monument.  The La Jolla town council sponsored a dedication 
ceremony on Easter Sunday, 1954, a service that featured Bible readings, prayers, and the 
singing of the hymn “Onward Christian Soldiers.” The memorial has often served as a site for 
subsequent Easter services, but the site has not been used for services on Veterans Day.68  This 
cross was erected by the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association in honor of fallen veterans from 
World Wars I and II and the Korean War.   
Despite this rationale, no plaques were placed by the cross to honor the war dead until 
1989, when one plaque was added to the display.  That year also marked the start of litigation 
over the constitutionality of the display.  Dozens more plaques honoring individual veterans were 
added to the display in 2000.  Subsequently, numerous travel guides, road maps, and the phone 
book referred to the site as the “Soledad Easter Cross” until litigation over its constitutionality 
began in the late 1980s.  In 2006, Congress seized the site from the city via eminent domain in 
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order to circumvent ongoing litigation in state courts.69  Litigation then moved back into federal 
court, beginning with a challenge to the legitimacy of the land transfer, which was dismissed for 
lack of standing. 
In 2008, federal District Court Judge Larry Burns issued a ruling on the merits of the 
case, dismissing the Establishment Clause issues raised by the plaintiffs, the Jewish War 
Veterans of America.  Judge Burns conceded that the Latin cross is “a universally-recognized 
religious symbol,” but focused his attention on the constitutionality of the entire war memorial, 
of which the cross is one facet.70  Citing anti-war protesters who used a number of crosses to 
highlight the number of troops who have died in the war in Iraq, Judge Burns contended: 
“Depending on the context in which it is displayed, the cross may evoke no particular religious 
impression at all.”71 
This analogy is hollow.  The reasons why the cross made for an effective anti-war protest 
symbol is the assumption that most soldiers in the U.S. armed forces are Christians, and that, 
when they die, they are likely to be buried under a cross headstone.  In no way does this 
connection strip the Latin cross of its religious significance; it merely completes a causal chain 
linking the cross to a symbol of death through its religious significance.  The judge also 
referenced cross headstones in military cemeteries as evidence of the cross being a secular 
symbol of death.  This argument is similarly faulty in that it conflates religious accommodation 
(of the religious heritage of individual soldiers) with government endorsement of religion. 
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Similar to other cases considered in this paper, Judge Burns attempted to downplay the 
prominence and significance of the cross compared to other elements in the display.  Though the 
cross in question is the tallest, highest, and most visible element in the display, the judge noted 
that it is not the largest.  According to the judge, the rest of the display is “replete with secular 
symbols” that diminish the religious influence of the cross.72  Since the cross is not supplemented 
with altars, religious texts, a chapel, or even benches that might encourage religious devotion, 
Judge Burns concluded, “When the cross is considered in the context of the larger memorial and 
especially the numerous other secular elements, the primary effect is patriotic and nationalistic, 
not religious.”73  At the same time, Judge Burns adopts the same false dichotomy employed by 
Justice Breyer in Van Orden – that a contrary judicial ruling would “envinc[e] a hostility to 
religion.”74 
A somewhat similar case is also working its way through the federal court system.  The 
Utah Highway Patrol Association (UHPA), a private organization, sought permission to erect 
public monuments to honor fallen troopers.  However, the UHPA chose a 12-foot tall white 
metal cross to be the basis for each monument to be constructed on public land though paid for 
by private funds.  When the group American Atheists filed suit to challenge the constitutionality 
of these monuments, the State of Utah curiously chose not to defend them the using the argument 
of religious accommodation to reflect the religious beliefs of the individual troopers.  The UHPA 
maintained that “only a cross could effectively convey the simultaneous messages of death, 
honor, remembrance, gratitude, sacrifice, and safety” (UHPA 2007).  Yet the UHPA stated in 
court that if the family of a Jewish trooper requested a different memorial symbol be used, they 
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would accommodate that request.  At this point reason breaks down.  If the cross is secular, why 
would the UHPA feel compelled to accommodate other religious viewpoints? 
Even more curious was the logic employed by U.S. District Court Judge David Sam 
siding with the UHPA and the State of Utah.  Judge Sam ruled that the displays did not endorse a 
particular religious belief because a majority of Utahans are members of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), which does not consider the cross to be a religious symbol.  
This line of thought is problematic on a couple of levels.  First, it implied that the First 
Amendment can take on different meanings in different sections of the country according to local 
demographics.  Fidelity to this theory would mean that erecting a cross on public land in a 
traditionally Jewish neighborhood would not violate the Establishment Clause because a 
majority of that community does not view the cross as religiously significant to them.  I seriously 
doubt that, many Jews in that scenario would agree with the judge’s assessment.   
Second, Judge Sam’s observation ignored the requirements of the “reasonable observer” 
test.  If a reasonable observer’s religious beliefs influence her conclusions about religious 
displays, the reasonable observer test becomes hopelessly subjective.  Also, given the sensitivity 
expressed by the UHPA towards respecting the wishes of the families of the fallen troopers, the 
more relevant question to be answered might be not the religious beliefs of the general 
population but the religious beliefs of each fallen trooper.  Evidence indicates that not every 
fallen trooper was a member of the LDS faith.75  Finally, the judge’s questionable rationale 
totally ignores the pluralistic roots of the Constitution’s protections of religious freedom by using 
the coercive force of law to ratify the dominant religion at the expense of other religious and 
non-religious viewpoints.  
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 Like the judge in the Mt. Soledad cross case, Judge Sam looked to military cemeteries as 
evidence of the secular value of the cross as a symbol of death.  In addition, he wrote, “Like the 
Christmas tree, which took on secular symbolism as Americans used the tree without subscribing 
to a particular religious belief, the cross has attained a secular status as Americans have used it to 
honor the place where fallen soldiers and citizens lay buried…regardless of their religious 
beliefs.”76   Judge Sam did not attempt to quantify how many of those fallen soldiers and citizens 
so honored were non-Christians.  Even setting aside obvious empirical problems in the judge’s 
reasoning, the more dangerous implication of such a declaration is that it undermines the deeply 
held religious beliefs of thousands of Christian war dead.  And like the Mt. Soledad case, a 
judicial opinion forbidding the public display of the cross would “exhibit hostility toward 
religion,”77  even though the cross is otherwise considered secular. 
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Sam in a unanimous opinion of a 
three-judge panel.78  Judge David Ebel described the cross as “unequivocally a symbol of the 
Christian faith” and that the memorial setting provided no contextual clues that the cross should 
be interpreted in any other fashion.  The fact that the displays contain biographical information 
about the trooper does not change the meaning of the display because most drivers would not 
stop their car to examine the memorial, and even if they did the cross is the dominant symbol in 
the display.  Judge Ebel stated that the Establishment Clause prevents endorsements of minority 
religions as well as dominant ones, rejecting the argument made about Mormons and their belief 
in the cross.  Judge Ebel also refuted the contention that the cross served as a universal symbol of 
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death, stating: “there is no evidence in the record that the cross has been universally embraced as 
a marker for the burial sites of non-Christians or as a memorial for a non-Christian's death.”79 
 A third cross case deserves mention.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had 
struck down a display of the Latin cross in a national preserve in the Mojave Desert on the 
grounds that the cross is a sacred Christian symbol.80  After that decision, Congress sold the 
single acre containing the cross to a private land owner in the hopes of escaping the reach of the 
Establishment Clause.  The legitimacy of that land transfer was upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Salazar v. Buono.81   
Though this case did not require the Supreme Court to decide whether the public display 
of a cross amounted to an Establishment Clause violation, Justice Scalia nonetheless discussed 
this issue during oral argument.  In a seeming reversal of his position in the Ten Commandments 
cases, Justice Scalia argued, “The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of the 
dead.” When challenged by an ACLU attorney arguing the case that no Jewish soldiers are 
buried under cross headstones, Scalia responded, “I don’t think you can leap from that to the 
conclusion that the only war dead that that cross honors are the Christian war dead.”82  Notably, 
Justice Scalia did not address this issue in his concurring opinion in the case. 
Justice Kennedy, who authored the plurality opinion, considered the message sent by the 
public display of the cross in dicta.  He utilized the same argument as Scalia and the district court 
judges cited above: “Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes 
thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles, 
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battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are forgotten.”83  Chief Justice Roberts 
echoed this perspective in his concurring opinion, but he also argued that removing the cross 
would exhibit hostility towards religion.84 
  Justice Stevens responded to this argument in his dissent by stating that a cross 
headstone represents an accommodation of a soldier’s religion, not a universal symbol of 
sacrifice.  Stevens wrote, “[The cross] is the symbol of one particular sacrifice, and that sacrifice 
carries deeply significant meaning for those who adhere to the Christian faith.”85  According to 
Stevens: “Making a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross 
secular. It makes the war memorial sectarian.”86 
III. Assessing the Harm Done to the Sanctity of Religion 
 The desacralization critique of these cases has been made before both by scholars and 
constitutional advocates.  Religious liberty advocacy groups have warned the Supreme Court 
against this jurisprudential course since it first embarked on it.  After the Court announced its 
decision in Lynch, a spokesman for the National Council of Churches (1984) criticized the case 
because it had put the birth of Jesus Christ “on the same level as Santa Claus and Rudolph the 
Red-Nosed Reindeer.”  In Allegheny County, Justice Stevens’ opinion cited the amicus briefs 
submitted by the American Jewish Congress, which argued that the presence of a Christmas tree 
“does not defeat the religious impact of the Menorah,” (1989, 41) and the American Jewish 
Committee, which argued that “many Jews would strongly object to the secularization of the 
menorah, a religious symbol” (1989, 52).  In an amicus brief submitted in Van Orden, the Baptist 
Joint Committee and the Interfaith Alliance Foundation argued that when justifying the display 
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of the Ten Commandments on secular grounds “government lends its weight to distorted 
readings of sacred texts; indeed, government litigators deliberately desacralize these sacred 
texts” (2005, 7). 
 The secularization critique also has been made in Establishment Clause literature.  
Sinsheimer applied the communications theory of ideographs to evaluate how judges use 
language to frame their decisions in religious display cases.  For example, Ann Sinsheimer 
pointed out that judges who are sympathetic to public displays of the Ten Commandments refer 
to such a monument as a “plaque,” rather than as a “tablet,” a term with greater religious 
overtones.87  Janet Dolgin criticized the Lynch majority for making a “serious misconstruction of 
the meaning of the crèche for religious Christians and non-Christians alike.”  The result in Lynch 
is achieved by “demeaning” the crèche’s religious significance.88   
Frank Ravitch concluded that the Court’s jurisprudence under this portion of the 
Establishment Clause is marked by a “general failure to explore adequately the power of 
religious objects and a strong tendency to characterize them in a manner that reinforces a 
secularized, yet majoritarian, view of religion in public life.”89  Finally, Timothy Zick criticized 
the handling of religious symbols through the endorsement test, as it is currently constructed, 
because its reasonable observer does not include any appreciation for religion.   Professor Zick’s 
prescription to the problem of interpreting sacred symbols is to adopt an ethnographic 
methodology,90 drawn largely from the anthropological work of Clifford Geertz.91  
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This paper hopes to build on this critique in two ways.  First, I have demonstrated the 
pervasiveness of the desacralization doctrine across a variety of different cases.  Second, I will 
respond to countervailing criticisms.  Supporters of the Court’s current doctrine likely will argue 
that, while this line of thinking may stoke the passions of academics, this debate would not affect 
ordinary citizens who encounter these religious displays on a daily basis.  Regardless of whether 
or not the government considers the Ten Commandments secular, citizens of Texas who walk the 
grounds of their capitol are free to make their own determination as to the meaning of that 
display.  Such a personal conclusion would not leave them feeling as though government has 
sullied their religious beliefs by secularizing a religious display.   
Justice Samuel Alito echoed this perspective in a recent government speech case, 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.92  He argued that the notion that a public monument has one 
objective message that the government is endorsing “fundamentally misunderstands the way 
monuments convey meaning. The meaning conveyed by a monument is generally not a simple 
one like ‘Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.’”  To buttress his claim, he cited the example of the 
mosaic “Imagine” in New York’s Central Park, which could be interpreted to be a reflection of 
John Lennon unfulfilled musical potential, the song “Imagine,” or a call to imagine a world 
without war or famine.93 
This is not a particularly persuasive argument.  The very reason judicial institutions 
produce opinions in addition to their rulings is because rationales for legal outcomes matter 
greatly within our democratic system.  An opinion that secularizes a religious symbol or practice 
in order to display it is of immense importance because the court has privileged only one 
legitimate meaning for that display.  Ronald Dworkin’s theory of constructive legal 
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interpretation holds that judicial opinions tell a story about underlying community values.  Thus, 
the key for judges is asking “[w]hich story shows the community in a better light, all things 
considered, from the standpoint of political morality?”94  Stripping religious symbols and 
practices of their theological significance reflects a blatant disregard of (or at least a callous 
indifference to) the religious beliefs of so many of its citizens.   
The vision of religion projected in these cases is shallow, one in which legal posturing 
can easily overcome the potency of religious belief.  By emphasizing history over theology, these 
cases implicitly hold that religion is unconnected to questions of political morality, despite the 
Religious Right’s insistence to the contrary.  One might argue that religion is intimately tied to 
questions of political morality in its proper place – the private sphere.  If that were the case, it 
seems oxymoronic to publicize that which is private, and it also leads us to ask whether that 
publicity amounts to an endorsement of religion. 
Dworkin reminds judges that their opinions “are themselves acts of the community 
personified.”95  If conservative Christian litigation groups are correct in their assertions that 
America is a Christian nation, they have encouraged the development of a doctrine that 
undermines that basic value.  The opinions analyzed in this paper demonstrate a personification 
of the American body politic that places little value on the sanctity of religion in the public 
square.  These opinions do not even accurately reflect the personification of non-Christian or 
non-Jewish Americans.  Though these Muslim, Sikh, or atheist citizens may not embrace the 
theological significance of a Ten Commandments monument, they at least understand that this 
type of symbol carries religious meaning for millions of their fellow Americans. 
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Selecting only one rationale in a judicial opinion effectively negates the legitimacy of all 
other meanings, according to Sanford Levinson.96  It is an opportunity cost that courts must 
impose to ensure the predictability and uniformity of law.  Justice Alito’s opinion in Summum 
exemplifies this argument; in supporting the Court’s government speech doctrine, Alito cited a 
prior government speech opinion: “It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor 
points of view.”97  Justice Alito concluded that privately donated monuments displayed on 
government property amounts to government speech, which further bolsters the harm to the 
sanctity of religion done in these cases.  Elsewhere, Professor Levinson noted: “If formal 
schooling is the most obvious example of self-conscious civic education designed to create, or at 
least maintain, a privileged notion of community identity, the relevance of public monuments 
and the like should now be clear.”98   
The importance of legitimacy also lies at the heart of the endorsement test that Justice 
O’Connor developed in Lynch (even if O’Connor reached the opposite conclusion on the merits 
of the case).99  She wrote: “Endorsement sends a message to non-adherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends 
the opposite message.”100  Far from being made preferred members of the community, 
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government has undermined the sanctity of numerous Jewish and Christian beliefs by either 
directly or indirectly secularizing these symbols and practices.   
Courts further damage the sanctity of religion when they assume that the placement of 
secular objects in close proximity to a religious symbol can remove that symbol’s religious 
significance, a claim that has been correctly criticized as using a “secular fig leaf”101 fraught with 
“serious problems”102 and even just plain “ludicrous.”103  This does not mean that context is 
insignificant; to the contrary, when properly applied, context can provide very useful signals by 
the government about its intentions. The task of the Herculean judge, according to Dworkin is to 
make a legal interpretation that best “fits and justifies” past legal practice.104  The application of 
context in these cases falls short of achieving a good fit.  In Lynch the Court fails to appreciate 
the fact that the secular Christmas symbols displayed by the town derive their significance from 
the religious origin of Christmas.  As Ravitch has noted: “Far from sending a nonreligious 
message, the placement of Santa, reindeer, elves and Christmas trees near a crèche sends a 
message that Christianity is the preferred religion.”105   
Unlike Lynch, the other objects displayed in near the Texas Capitol – honoring war 
veterans, women, children, and others106 – have little connection to the Ten Commandments, and 
yet in Van Orden Justice Breyer attempted to weave them together into a coherent and unified 
presentation.  But what would be more relevant is the immediate context of the Ten 
Commandments monument, such as any text explaining the nature of the government’s 
intentions by erecting the monument.  Yet no such text exists.  The religious meaning of the Ten 
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Commandments is the dominant meaning of the symbol.  Without the theological significance, 
the Ten Commandments would cease to have much secular or historical influence.  Thus, to pass 
the reasonable observer test, the government has the responsibility to explain why a secondary 
meaning of the symbol is being emphasized rather than the dominant meaning. 
Context would also provide an indication of governmental endorsement over a religious 
display in front of a state capitol because a reasonable observer would conclude that displays at 
that location would be representative of a community’s moral values.  This problem would not 
be present in other contexts, for example, religious art at a government-sponsored museum.  In 
that situation, the Establishment Clause’s reasonable observer could easily conclude the museum 
was endorsing the aesthetic and cultural of the art.  Curators often display artwork that makes 
social or moral critiques that the curator (or the curator’s boss, the state) would not endorse.  
Making artistic decisions on these criteria does not secularize religion because a curator’s 
decision is not a Dworkinian act of the community personified because artwork in a museum 
comes from many different cultures and many different times.  Even if an art exhibit featured 
works from modern America, a constructive interpretation of an art exhibit would attempt to put 
the artwork in the best light from the perspective of aesthetics, not political morality. 
Judges, according to Dworkin, are interpreters because all social practices (including law) 
have meaning.  That is, social practices are more than just accidents of history; they exist in 
support of a social value or principle.  All forms of interpretation, whether artistic, scientific, or 
legal, must attempt to understand the purpose of the practice being interpreted.  This purpose 
may not be the same as what the creator of the practice intended, but it does not mean that any 
purpose may be imposed at random upon a particular practice.  Interpreters must pay careful 
attention to the relevant data, which suggests that judges should give great weight to legal facts 
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in determining the purpose served by a religious symbol or practice.107  Thus, Judge Sam was 
perhaps too quick to dismiss the evidence that the Mt. Soledad Cross was often used for religious 
purposes. 
Rather than being concerned with describing a social practice as it is, Dworkin urges a 
constructive interpretation, which involves “imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to 
make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”108  In 
refuting the notion that interpretation should be concerned with accuracy (such as the intentions 
of the author), Dworkin points out that interpreting a practice requires analyzing the practice 
independent of what members of society intend to express by participating in the practice.  The 
consequence of this argument is that social scientists must participate in the practice in order to 
interpret it.  This ethnographic approach to interpretation is similar in nature to Zick’s criticism 
of the Supreme Court.109   
Applied to religious symbols and practices cases, the Court could not conclude that a 
symbol is religious simply because most people who walk by it think it is religious.  Instead 
Dworkinian interpreters process through three stages: a “preinterpretive” stage in which the 
content of the practice is identified, an interpretive stage in which an interpreter selects “a 
general justification” for the practice, and a “postinterpretive” stage in which the interpreter 
“adjusts his sense of what the practice ‘really’ requires so as to better serve” the original 
justification.110  A judge interpreting the Ten Commandments display in Austin, Texas might 
justify the display on the grounds that it serves an important educational interest – educating the 
public of the connection between parts of the Ten Commandments and modern law.  The judge 
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might then think that the Ten Commandments monument is not what is really required to achieve 
this objective because it contains no other materials explaining this connection.   
The judge would then return to the drawing board and consider that the objects that a 
state displays on its capitol grounds are reflections of the values of that state.  Professor Levinson 
noted that monuments “are ways by which a specific culture names its heroes, those ‘people who 
made us what we are in a prideful way.’”111  How does a Ten Commandments monument fit into 
this justification?  What is the basis for the pride in the Ten Commandments?  Without any other 
context explaining the monument, the judge falls back on the primary meaning of the Ten 
Commandments – religion.  This justification makes sense in that many Texans are Christians 
and religion is a powerful force in that society. 
Dworkin’s interpretive theory assumes that “individuals have a right to equal concern and 
respect”112 by their government, a theory very similar to the conception of justice as fairness 
articulated by John Rawls.113  These cases might not seem to undermine this mandate because no 
one religious group is being deemed socially superior if courts deny that these symbols and 
practices are religious.  If religion is central to a person’s identity, however, secularizing 
religious symbols and practices undermines the value of religion and, in turn, the value of a 
person’s identity.  This disregard for an individual’s dignity through these cases could constitute 
a denial of equal respect.  Dworkin emphasizes this principle in the hopes of protecting minority 
rights against tyrannical majority rule, but these cases demonstrate the principle can serve the 
Christian majority in America.   
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IV. Conclusion 
My primary goal is to convince courts to give adequate respect to the sanctity of religion, 
an approach that has been lacking in the current jurisprudence.  Recognizing the religious import 
of these symbols and practices does not preordain the outcome of the case.  Justice Thomas, who 
upheld the display of the Ten Commandments,114 used the same argument about the sanctity of 
religion as Justice Brennan.115  Whether Justice Thomas or Brennan has a better approach to the 
proper reach of the Establishment Clause is beyond the scope of this analysis.  Under the Court’s 
current approach, this type of Establishment Clause dialogue is impossible.  Desacralizing 
religious symbols and practices effectively ends the constitutional debate over these public 
displays by short-circuiting the Constitution.  Acknowledging these symbols and practices for 
their core meaning allows judges to move from understanding the facts of the case to analyzing 
how the Establishment Clause provides a resolution to the controversy.   
In its Free Speech Clause jurisprudence, the Court never attempts to minimize the 
importance of a message in order to engage in a similar short-circuiting of the Constitution.  In 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul,116 though Justice Scalia struck down a city ordinance against certain types of 
hate speech, he did not attempt to devalue the significance of burning a cross in a person’s front 
yard, calling such behavior “reprehensible.”117  Even in the infamous “BONG HiTS 4 Jesus” 
case, the Court refused to lower the importance of the message being litigated.  The student who 
made the banner containing the cryptic phrase called his message “meaningless and funny,” but 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the message’s reference to illegal drugs deserved to be 
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evaluated in a more consequential light.118  Surely the most precious symbols and practices of the 
nation’s religions deserve the same serious treatment. 
Unfortunately, the current jurisprudence has been ratified several times by the Supreme 
Court, in no small part because of the support of litigation groups whose members whose faith 
plays a central role in their lives.  For example, the popular televangelist Pat Robertson was 
instrumental in founding the American Center for Law and Justice.   Robertson has publicly 
stated that the Christmas tree has pagan roots and therefore should not be considered “an integral 
part of Christianity.”119  However, it is precisely because the Christmas tree was not deemed to 
be Christian by the Supreme Court in Lynch that lawyers and jurists created the secular basis 
upon which the crèche can be displayed publicly.  Similarly, when a Ten Commandments 
monument outside the Alabama Supreme Court building was removed by court order, hundreds 
of protestors screamed “God haters!” and wore t-shirts that read “Jesus is the standard.”120  
Ironically, though, it was groups on the Christian right that argued in Van Orden and McCreary 
County that the Ten Commandments should be publicly celebrated for their historical and 
cultural contributions and that the theological import of these monuments should be 
deemphasized.   
Strategically the desacralization approach utilized by some Christian right litigation 
groups makes sense. The desacralization doctrine has found support on the Supreme Court for 
the last 25 years.  No one can argue with the fact that advancing this doctrine has produced the 
desired policy result for the Christian right – religious symbols remain on display in public.  
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From a larger perspective, though, this is a shortsighted strategy that is at least partially self-
defeating because securing these public displays compromises their religiosity through judicial 
fiat.  A strategy that is considered effective politically may be ineffective or even damaging 
when judged from a religious perspective.  It is precisely these conservative Christian groups that 
seek to view politics through a religious perspective. 
 To be sure, though, the implications of these decisions affect many more people than 
those on the Christian right.  Millions of Americans Christians of all denominations, and, as a 
result of County of Allegheny, millions of American Jews have watched their government toss 
aside any possibility that their religious symbols and practices possess a sacred quality that is 
entitled to judicial notice and respect.  The null hypothesis is that judges are more accurate 
interpreters than I give them credit for – that these symbols and practices are considered secular 
by most Americans.  It is one thing that many Christians may view Santa Claus or a Christmas 
tree as secular symbols, despite their religious origins, but I seriously doubt that this logic can be 
extended to more fundamentally religious symbols. 
Thus, I fall back on the alternative hypothesis – courts are failing to give adequate 
attention to the religious nature of these symbols and practices.  The disregard for religion in 
these cases has raised the ire of religious liberty groups, scholars, and justices from both 
ideological wings of the U.S. Supreme Court.  I fully agree with Justices Blackmun and 
Scalia:121 these are, indeed, Pyrrhic victories.  As Justice Black once stated: “The Establishment 
Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution 
                                               
121 At least, I agree with Justice Scalia’s position in 2005 during the debate over the Ten Commandments cases and 
Justice Blackmun’s position in Lynch.   
 34 
that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil 
magistrate.”122 
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